

Long-term legacies of wars

Francisco Villamil

War, peace, and political violence

UC3M, Fall 2024







The consequences of wars

- Legacies of violence
 - attitudes, identities, ideologies, etc
- Social processes of war
 - how social life changes as a result of war
- Institutional consequences
 - what happens to the state?
- Economic consequences
 - how does growth and inequality change?

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- **Differences** between interstate and civil wars?

The legacies of violence

- What are the long-term consequences of specific events of violence?







Long-term consequences of violence

- Do specific events of violence matter?

Backfiring argument

- A key idea is that those who suffer or are exposed to violence are more likely to **reject** the perpetrator (or the group linked to violence)
- This is usually called the **backfiring argument**
- Old idea: “The seed of revolution is repression” (W. Wilson)

The Legacy of Political Violence across Generations



Noam Lupu Vanderbilt University
Leonid Peisakhin New York University–Abu Dhabi

Abstract: *Does political violence leave a lasting legacy on identities, attitudes, and behaviors? We identify the identities of victims and that families transmit these effects across generations. Inherited contemporary attitudes and behaviors of the descendants of victims. Testing these hypotheses is fi challenges; to overcome them, we study the deportation of Crimean Tatars in 1944 and the in died from starvation and disease. We conducted a multigenerational survey of Crimean Tatar descendants of individuals who suffered more intensely identify more strongly with their ethnic g the Crimean Tatar political leadership, hold more hostile attitudes toward Russia, and participi find that victimization has no lasting effect on religious radicalization. We also provide eviden down from the victims of the deportation to their descendants.*

Replication Materials: The data, code, and any additional materials required to replicate cle are available on the American Journal of Political Science Dataverse within the Harvar <http://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/VEPHLS>.

States regularly perpetrate violence against their inhabitants.¹ A conservative official estimate puts the number of victims of Stalinist repressions at 3.8 million (Zemskov 1991), and an estimated 1.5 million people died in the countryside alone during China's Cultural Revolution (MacFarquhar and Schoenhaus 2008). Moreover, state-sponsored and politically motivated violence against minority groups remains a defining feature of contemporary politics. These experiences profoundly shape how victims interact with the state and think about politics. Some become politically apathetic and withdraw from political activity (Benard 1994; Wood 2006), whereas others mobilize into collective action (Bellows and Miguel 2009). Many develop feelings of victimization and sensitivity to perceived threats as a result of

Political scientists know experiences can sometimes situations can affect politics (Acemoglu, Johnson, and cal identities formed in a j can endure for decades (o Busse 2006; Lupu and Sto But these legacies are ofte through persistent instituti religious communities. Mig olence similarly leave lasir they be passed down throug generation, as suggested by mission (Bisin and Verdier : Answering this questio

The Political Legacy of Violence: The Long-Term Impact of Stalin's Repression in Ukraine

Arturas Rozenas, New York University
Sebastian Schutte, University of Konstanz
Yuri Zhukov, University of Michigan

Political scientists have long been interested in how indiscriminate violence affects the behavior of its victims, yet most research has focused on short-term military consequences rather than long-term political effects. We argue that large-scale violence can have an intergenerational impact on political preferences. Communities more exposed to indiscriminate violence in the past will—in the future—oppose political forces they associate with the perpetrators of that violence. We document evidence for this claim with archival data on Soviet state violence in western Ukraine, where Stalin's security services suppressed a nationalist insurgency by deporting over 250,000 people to Siberia. Using two causal identification strategies, we show that communities subjected to a greater intensity of deportation in the 1940s are now significantly less likely to vote for “pro-Russian” parties. These findings show that indiscriminate violence systematically reduces long-term political support for the perpetrator.

An exposure to large-scale violence shape the political behavior of affected communities generations later? Previous research has highlighted the formative role of violence in political development (Balcells 2012; Blattman 2009; Kalyvas 2006). Yet we know little about how violence affects long-term political preferences and attitudes, and whether this effect—previously studied at the individual level—also extends to communities.

We argue that indiscriminate violence reduces long-term political support for the perpetrator. Communities that experienced indiscriminate violence in the past tend to vote—generations later—against political forces they hold responsible for that violence. We empirically evaluate this claim with archival data on the Soviet campaign against nationalist rebels in western Ukraine (1943–50)—a “hard test” for our

support base. If even such militarily “successful” discriminate violence reduce political support in th we can expect similar patterns to hold in cases in perpetrators were unable to militarily defeat their of the time.

We employ two independent research designs the persistent effect of Soviet violence in western election results from 2004 to 2014. First, we use a viet railroads as an instrumental variable to exploit variation in deportations due to logistics. Second, a fuzzy regression discontinuity design, exploiting i variation in repression levels due to the discretion cret police officials and Communist Party leaders. are similar across the two designs: contemporary el port for “pro-Russian” parties is substantially weak




Figure 1. Historical violence and contemporary voting in western Ukraine. The figure on the left shows the counts of deported individuals. The right panel shows the pro-Russian vote margin in the 2014 parliamentary elections. The westernmost rayons in white have no election data because the USSR returned them to Poland in 1945. Historical boundaries of oblasts appear in white. Please refer to appendix 2 for residualized maps that account for systematic regional differences.

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- Or is it about discourses and conflict-wide effects?
 - If my relative, friend, neighbor was killed, would that change the way I think politically?
- A lot of this depends on what we think about **how wartime violence happens** and **whether what happens in a war leaves legacies**

Thinking about legacies of wars

		Wartime behavior/targeting?	
		Pre-determined	Endogenous
Effects prevail?	Yes		
	No		

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	No	Civil wars are irrelevant	'Wicked games'

Does violence always backfire?

The family had come to accept their secret, and silence helped them to reconcile their experiences with their present reality. They did not dream of revenge [...], neither did they did dream of freedom. **They even thought that Franco was a good man who knew nothing of the crimes, injustices, and miseries committed against people like themselves.** When Franco came to Almeria, they went to cheer him.

(Account of a victimized family in Almeria, 1957. Cazorla-Sánchez 2009, 3)

Alvaro Uribe accused of paramilitary ties

Former Colombian president accused of sponsoring militia in mid-1990s



Alvaro Uribe is widely hailed for major security gains against leftist rebels during his 2002-10 presidency. Photograph: Rodrigo Arangua/AFP/Getty Images

A jailed Colombian paramilitary chief has accused former President Alvaro Uribe of sponsoring his illegal armed group in the mid-1990s.

In the video, Pablo Hernan Sierra says he organised a militia that operated from the Guacharacas ranch owned by Uribe's family in the northwestern state of Antioquia in 1996 when Uribe was the state's governor.

Uribe is widely praised for security gains against leftist rebels during his 2002-10 presidency, and Sierra is the first former paramilitary leader to directly accuse him of sponsoring the illegal militias responsible for most killings in Colombia's long-running conflict.

The video, which was presented by leftwing congressman Iván Cepeda on Wednesday, was recorded last month when he visited the prison where

2006 Colombian presidential election



← 2002

28 May 2006

2010 →

Turnout

45.05%



Nominee

Álvaro Uribe

Carlos Gaviria
Díaz

Horacio Serpa

Party

Colombia First

PDA

Liberal

Running mate

Francisco
Santos
Calderón

Patricia Lara
Salive

José Gregorio
Hernández
Galindo

Popular vote

7,397,835

2,613,157


1,404,235

Percentage

62.35%

22.03%

11.84%



Results by department

Efraim Rios Montt: Guatemala ex-leader tried for genocide dies

1 April 2018

Share ↩ Save +



1999 Guatemalan general election



← 1995–96

2003 →

Presidential election

7 November 1999 (first round)
26 December 1999 (second round)

Turnout 53.76% (first round) ▲ 6.96pp
40.37% (second round) ▼ 3.49pp



Nominee	Alfonso Portillo	Óscar Berger
Party	FRG	PAN
Running mate	Juan Francisco Reyes	Arabella Castro
Popular vote	1,184,932	549,408
Percentage	68.32%	31.68%




Figure 6.6: State violence against civilians in Guatemala, 1978-1




Figure 6.4: FRG results in 1999 elections

Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

🌐 24 languages ▾

Article Talk

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From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Large-scale killings and **civil unrest** primarily targeting members and supposed sympathizers of the **Communist Party of Indonesia** (PKI) were carried out in Indonesia from 1965 to 1966. Other affected groups included alleged **communist** sympathisers, **Gerwani** women, **trade unionists**,^[15] ethnic Javanese **Abangan**,^[2] **ethnic Chinese**, **atheists**, so-called "**unbelievers**", and alleged **leftists** in general. According to the most widely published estimates at least 500,000 to 1 million people were killed,^{[4]:3}^[5]^[6]^[8] with some estimates going as high as two to three million.^[16]^[17] The atrocities, sometimes described as a **genocide**^[18]^[3]^[4] or a **politicide**,^[19]^[20] were instigated by the **Indonesian Army**

Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

Part of the **Cold War in Asia** and **Transition to the New Order**



A **Chinese Indonesian** student at **Res Publica University** attacked by a crowd and being led away by soldiers, 15 October 1965

Location Indonesia
Date 1965–1966

The Country With No Left

BY

MAX LANE

In the mid 1960s, the Indonesian military massacred hundreds of thousands of radicals. The country's left still hasn't recovered.

On June 27, Indonesians flocked to polling stations across the country to vote in local elections. On the ballot were mayors, district heads, and governors in 171 of Indonesia's more than 500 electorates.

VIOLENT



VICTORS

Why Bloodstained Parties
Win Postwar Elections

SARAH ZUKERMAN DALY

Long-term legacies

- It's not only about the consequences of wartime violence





ASESINO

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THE WEEKEND ESSAY

IN THE SHADOW OF THE HOLOCAUST

*How the politics of memory in Europe obscures what we see in
Israel and Gaza today.*

By Masha Gessen

December 9, 2023



Social processes of civil wars

- Civil wars not only involve changes at the higher power levels, but fundamentally change social and political dynamics at the local level

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Impact on **civilian life**

- Changes in local actors, practices, institutions, etc often have long-term consequences in the postwar period

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1. Political mobilization

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
- Prewar mobilization, social movements, wartime mobilization and recruitment, etc
- Civilians get much more involved in politics during wars, not only in terms of recruitment, but also in other forms of collective action, offering non-military support, etc

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1. Political mobilization

- Prewar mobilization, social movements, wartime mobilization and recruitment, etc
- Civilians get much more involved in politics during wars, not only in terms of recruitment, but also in other forms of collective action, offering non-military support, etc
- Mobilization varies a lot and depends on armed groups (collaboration networks vs coercion or forced recruitment, etc), wartime events (e.g. reaction to civilian victimization), civilian social structures, etc

Social processes of civil wars



Patrullas de Autodefensa Civil
(Guatemala)



Rondas campesinas (Peru)

Lynching Persists in Guatemala

BY DANIEL ALTSCHULER | DECEMBER 15, 2009

Lynchings are wreaking havoc again in rural Guatemala. In a recent 15-day span, **nine people have been lynched here by citizens** who chose to take justice into their own hands. And in the past year, lynch mobs have attacked **over 250 people**, resulting in at least 42 deaths. The numbers are scary, and they reflect the reality that Guatemala has not forgotten a crucial part of its grisly past. In addition to the deaths caused, the lynchings reflect the inadequacy and inaccessibility of state justice institutions and the legacies of violence from civil war and state-sponsored genocide.

Ukraine's 'territorial defense' trains civilians against possible hitches amid tensions

Reservist officers provide basic military, other training for volunteer civilians to counter possible military threats

Jeyhun Aliyev, Talha Yavuz | 06.02.2022 - Update : 07.02.2022



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- But as the war goes on, increased alignment, as people choose sides:
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 - b. Looking for protection
 - c. Moral outrage
- Variation within a single conflict: Getting caught 'between two fires'? Is it possible to stay neutral? etc

Social processes of civil wars

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- War transforms gender roles, with likely long-term consequences
- Women combatants comprised more than a quarter of the insurgent force in many civil wars (Peru, Sri Lanka, ...), which introduces a huge change to their traditional social roles
- Also: women from rural, isolated areas becoming interlocutors with the state, looking for detainees, etc



FRUSTINO GR...
E JIMON.

AÑO
1
9
8
2

TEODORO MENDEZ MUSIA: 1983

LO
ASIST...
MON



Micro and macro

- Legacies and social processes usually refer to **micro-level consequences**
 - This means that we often see **variation** in violence and in how war impacts social life, and therefore consequences vary
- But some consequences of war are more related to **macro** outcomes
Economic growth, patterns of inequality, institutions, etc

Economic consequences

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
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 - Different conflicts, different effects?


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 - What if a bad economic situation is the continuation of pre-war trends?
- The question is **how** it affects the economy, e.g.
 - Different conflicts, different effects?
 - How long its legacies last? How?






Economic consequences of war



Walter Scheidel (2018)

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
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Economic consequences of war


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- The 'Four Horsemen' of leveling: mass-mobilization warfare, transformative revolutions, state collapse, and catastrophic plagues



Walter Scheidel (2018)

Economic consequences of war

- Main argument: inequality only decreases after mass violence or catastrophes
- The 'Four Horsemen' of leveling: mass-mobilization warfare, transformative revolutions, state collapse, and catastrophic plagues
- Situations when the rich have more to lose and/or the poor increase their relative power



Walter Scheidel (2018)


Scheidel's *The great leveler*

- Inter-state wars that involve **mass-mobilization** decrease inequality
- Different to pre-modern wars (winners win, losers lose, more inequality)

Scheidel's *The great leveler*


- Inter-state wars that involve **mass-mobilization** decrease inequality
- Different to pre-modern wars (winners win, losers lose, more inequality)
- **What about civil wars?** Similar to pre-modern wars, inequality increases: increased value of capital, war confiscations, etc
 - Civil war \neq revolution, but often go together

Inequality over time



Europe

Inequality over time



United States

Social and institutional legacies

- How do wars impact macro-level sociopolitical institutions?
- Probably the most important thing and what we know less about

Social and institutional legacies

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- War and state development in medieval Europe, but does that apply to civil war?
- Unclear, in many cases, a weak state is the product of civil wars
- But for example, the case of **Uganda**: Museveni established local councils during the civil war, which were later scaled up in the post-war period



Predicted
State capacity

