# Rebel groups

Francisco Villamil

War, peace, and political violence UC3M, Fall 2023



Confederate Army in the US



FLNC in Corsica, France



Hamas in Gaza



ELN in Colombia

# Russian ruble keeps rolling out in 'Donetsk People's Republic' community

By Euronews · Updated: 26/05/2015





The self-declared Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) has two currencies in circulation: Ukrainian Hryvnas and Russian Rubles.

#### Donetsk People's Republic

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  - 2. Why are they different?
  - 3. What consequences do these differences have? (their behavior)

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- If you think about these, some refer to **actions** and some to **characteristics**

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  - ightarrow Not talking about violence here (only, at least)

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- **Rebels** make a **decision** on how to rule local civilians, and **civilians** also have some **influence** on how they are ruled
- This 'wartime social order' can be purely coercive and violent, but most groups engage in some form of governance:
  - ightarrow taxation, popular assemblies, courts, schools, etc

# Sri Lankan civil war (1983–2009)



# LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam)



# LTTE & civilian governance







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- **Rebel governance** is developed to win over the support of the local population and disincentivize collaboration with the enemy
  - $\rightarrow$  Very dependent on territorial control (you can't obviously build banks or bureaucracies if you are a guerrilla group without firm territorial control)

#### Rebel governance


• But why do groups differ on how their relate to civilians?



Charles Taylor's NPFL in Liberia


FNML in El Salvador

• Why do some groups use violence while other restrain themselves?




Jeremy Weinstein (2007)

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
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- Do you have natural resources or foreign funding? No need for civilian cooperation, rule by the sword
- 2. Do you need 'social endowments'? You need to win 'hearts and minds'




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
## What about ISIS?



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• What would you expect from ISIS?



#### ISIS public execution in Raqqa (Syrian Civil War)

HOME > MILITARY & DEFENSE

# ISIS made millions from taxes that it then used to run garbage collections and even a DMV

Rosie Perper Apr 6, 2018, 7:41 AM



In this photo released on April 17, 2015 by a militant website, which has been verified and is consistent with other AP reporting, a member of the Islamic State group's vice police known as "Hisba," patrols a market in Raqqa City, Syria. Militant website / AP

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- So why would an oil-rich group as ISIS engage in costly governance?
- The role of ideology, not only material incentives
  - ightarrow Which also explains many other aspects of rebel governance
- War pressures
  - $\rightarrow$  Similar to Tilly's state formation idea

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
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- Some focus on economic production, health, education, some develop more participatory institutions, etc



FIGURE 2.2 Typology of wartime social orders

(Social contract  $\approx$  laws)



Ana Arjona (2017)



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(Social contract pprox laws)

 Rebel groups try to mazimize territorial control and what they get out of it Rebelocracy Social Order in the Colombian Cuil War Ana Arjona

#### Ana Arjona (2017)



FIGURE 2.2 Typology of wartime social orders

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- Rebel groups try to mazimize territorial control and what they get out of it
- Therefore, they should prefer order to disorder, and more intervention (rebelocracy) than less (aliocracy)

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Ana Arjona (2017)

- When does **order and rebelocracy** emerge? (i.e. when do rebel engage in extensive governance?)
- Depends on the rebels' time horizon and prewar local institutions

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- 4. Areas where civilians retain control, rebels establish *aliocracy*: a form of indirect rule, controlling only the basics of security and taxation

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#### Civilian influence and resistance

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- Alliance formation (rebels, social sectors/orgs)

# Beyond governance

- Different experiences remembered by recruits for the Salvadorian army vs the FMLN
  - $\rightarrow\,$  Army: forced recruitment, beatings, humiliations...
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- 'Internal institutions':
  - $\rightarrow$  recruitment
  - $\rightarrow$  military training
  - $\rightarrow\,$  political education
  - $\rightarrow\,$  disciplinary measures
- Does it matter?



#### Beyond governance: killing civilians

The New York Times

#### MASSACRE OF HUNDREDS REPORTED IN SALVADOR VILLAGE


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By Raymond Bonner, Special To the New York Times Jan. 27, 1982

From interviews with people who live in this small mountain village and surrounding hamlets, it is clear that a massacre of major proportions occurred here last month.

In some 20 mud brick huts here, this reporter saw the charred skulls and bones of dozens of bodies buried under burned-out roofs, beams and shattered tiles. There were more along the trail leading through the hills into the village, and at the edge of a nearby cornfield were the remains of 14 young men, women and children.


In separate interviews during a two-week period in the rebelcontrolled northern part of Morazan Province, 13 peasants said that all these, their relatives and friends, had been killed by Government soldiers of the Atlacatl Battalion in a sweep in December. 733 Victims Listed



Dec 1981, almost 1,000 civilians killed, many children & women

# Beyond governance: killing civilians

• Compare FMLN to Peru's Shinning Path



Hoover Green (2018)

# Beyond governance: killing civilians

- Compare FMLN to Peru's Shinning Path
- The Commander's Dilemma: to win a war, you need to train and arm violent soldiers, but you also need to *control* how and when violence is employed
- When do we observe restraint? When commanders create institutions to discipline soldiers and socialize them politically



#### Hoover Green (2018)

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Global Summit to End Sexual Violence in Conflict, 2014

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- 1. Rape as *collateral* violence, opportunistic & private reasons
- 2. Rape as strategic violence
  - $\rightarrow\,$  Sexual violence offers organizational advantages related to warfare
- Rape as practice
  - $\rightarrow\,$  Socialization, organizational aspects, absence of restraint, etc



US troops in Vietnam, My Lai massacre (1968)

### Beyond civil wars: gangs



'Combo' members in Colombia